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managerial (inside) ownership and outside (equity).This stratification differs in many 
literatures. But for the purpose of this study, the proportion of firm's equity own by the 
board of Directors, Chairman of the Board, and the Chief Executive officer will be 
classified as inside ownership, while the proportion not own by them will be classified 
as outside ownership. 
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether there is a strong evidence to support 
the notion that variation across firms in observed ownership structure result in 
systematic variations in observed firms' performance, that is, whether ownership 
structure of Nigerian firms influence their level of performance. 
The data for this study were extracted from companies' annual reports and 
accounts filed with the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE). A total of twenty companies 
were sampled from various sectors. They include Incar Nig. Pic, in the Automobile & 
Tyre sector, Ekocorp pic. in the Healthcare sector, Neimeth Pic also in the Healthcare 
sector, May + Baker Nig. Pic, Vita foam Nig. Pic in the industrial&Domestic product 
sector, Dimnond Bank, Guarantee Trust Bank pic in the banking sector. Others include 
Okomu Oil palm company pic in the agriculture sector, Chellarams pic in the 
conglomerates, LASACO Assurance Pic, in the insurance sector, Betaglass Pic, in the 
Packaging sector, Northern Nig. Flour mills Pic in the Food/Beverages & Tobacco 
sector, First Aluminium Nig Pic in the Industrial/domestic product sector, 
Glaxosmithkline Consumer Pic in the Health sector, First Bank Pic and Intercontinental 
Bank in the banking sector. They constitute the first group whose managerial or outside 
equity is less than 51%. The second group whose inside equity exceeds 51% are Smart 
product Pic and Cutix Pic in the Emerging market sector, C &1 Leasing Pic in the 
Managed funds sector and A VON Crowncaps &Containers (Nig) Pic in the Packaging 
sector. 
The thrust of this study was directed by alternative hypotheses that; 
1. There is a positive relationship between inside equity ownership and firm's 
performance. 
• 2. That there is a positive relationship between outside equity ownership and firm's 
performance. 
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accounting artifact problems for several reasons. Fin;t, as tihle r.al:!i o ())f :t!he firm's matr:OOt 
value to the replacement cost of tangible capital approxmmatt:es Q, Iit lfl())es not refle.at 1!lne 
value investors assign to a firm's intangible capital nor dloes ~t jllil.cJl!lde inves'tiiJllairtt-s 
made in intangible assets . As Lindberg and Ross El9~r» IIIDjnllie:dl c())1lllt, 'f«lim's iQ) ·s lhii.gllrl 
when the firm has valuable intangible assets in additaolil 1llO ttaJngnih>TI.e o:mes . Seo<mrull., 
• 
empirical studies in the area of the impact: of owncrsrup s!llrtlJLcruire (QE pofitat'IOOlliicy 1lhat: 
use Tobin's Q or not measure the replacement cost of tangiilbk C.2lj)l)ittatl. liJnS1tea.dl., tt!hejy 'SU.e 
as a proxy the book value of total assets. Book values ge.mer.allay lhrawe -seni())US prdlDIIelllllS 
of their own caused by inflation and arbitrary depnecii,attiico)JI} dJn())ioes. MIDJiO())V.etr, 
replacement costs are very difficult to appraise. Aooordnllil.g m ttllne Lindberg alJ!ld }t())SS 
(1981) Model, replacement cost can be measured by using a IP.eql>eitruJ.all Iirmweliltory ~<aKd 
and making sensible adjustments for capital goods price iillllifllatnOCl>lll, ttllne depreoialtJi<ronlf.alte 
and technological progress. Dickerson, Gibson :and Ts.alkaliOCl>lc())S 1EzK~EFF1F pR())Wiidadl .a 
calculation of the replacement cost for the UK companies rn llllil.muf.adlll!mi.ing. 
Previous empirical work included additional varialbae.s rin ttlbe regressiiDns lt()) 
control for the possibility that factors other than owlliler:ship s11rr11Jlo.tlure may ihave • 
impact on Tobin's Q. Control variables include distributiOCl>n expenses .as .a IfiraatJicm ®f 
sales revenues, debt to book value of total assets '(kveracgep :a:mlil ttllne ma:rlloot: 
concentration ratio. Distribution expenses are 111sro to exp:t.ailln ~moes run 
measurement of Tobin 's Q that are caused by accounting arrtiifaots. A<oc:o>1!li1Illii:m_g ]prr.aOtrioes 
do not treat intangible and tangible capital similarly. As noted, pM(())rm21.llilCe .Illeasure IDff 
Tobin's Q maybe distorted because its denominator (i.e. tlhle lflfjp~ent rooSit cof 
tangible capital or the book value of total assets) doe.s not take mnll()) aoooUITit the w.allue ((j)Jf 
intangible assets. Observable measures of the.se intangible as:Scts rindll!lde reseanaln ,and 
development (RD) expenditures, land, buiading and equipmeant eXJPenditures m ew:m 
distribution expenses. Leverage is included in the set of expl:arrilatiDcy variables attf 
Panayotis and Sophia, (2006) to capture the ·"Value enhancing or v.alll!le ll'.educing elflfi.edts 
of the differences that might exist between the inillerest obiiga.triiDlii.S :irmuumred wlbeim 
borrowing took place ... " (Dern.setz and ViHalonga, 2001). ll.rn imifilati())nary peri oms, <.dl.elbtt 
sold in an earlier period will be paid back in money of a lesser vallllle~ inn de!f!LatiGm, lit \\oVIilll1 
be paid back in money with a higher value. 
The indicators of market concentration ace a]tematiiwely used, the top four IEirin 
concentration ratio (CR4) and a herfindahl measure of manket s1il1l!J.o:tu.re (Hindex). OR.4 
is the sum of the four largest shares in the market, whik Hindex its tlh.e sum of <Sql!l.artrd 
market shares of all firms in the market. Concenrration irndic.arors are used to acocmrnt 
for the cross firm variations in Tobin's Q of the profit rate lth.at are rll!le to cross lfiimn 
difference sin pricing power. Firrn.s that are more efficiemt arr:Hi Jiimme aggressive llin 
pricing have greater market shares (Panayotis and Sop'hna., 2.006). The ll!lsuaJ :fiirnmg in 
the industrial organization literature is that market Sil:rll!Latlllre posit:iwcly relates m tfiimm 
performance. The· incentive alignment argument by Jes.en :lil[i)d Meo:Jiling ([976) pms'itt:s 
· that "more equity ownership by the manger may increase oo.npor.ate jpe.If({])TJ]l]illDoe 
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b e c a u s e  i t  m e a n s  b e t t e r  a l i g n m e n t  o f  t h e  m o n e t a r y  i n c e n t i v e s  b e t w e e n  t h e  m a n a g e r  a n d  
o t h e r  e q u i t y  o w n e r s .  
T h e  E n t r e n c h m e n t  a r g u m e n t  b y  M o r e k  e t  a l  ( 1 9 8 8 ) ,  s t a t e s  t h a t  m o r e  e q u i t y  
o w n e r s h i p  b y  t h e  m a n a g e r  m a y  d e c r e a s e  f i n a n c i a l  p e r f o r m a n c e  b e c a u s e  m a n a g e r s  w i t h  
l a r g e  o w n e r s h i p  s t a k e s  m a y  b e  s o  p o w e r f u l  t h a t  t h e y  d o  n o t  h a v e  t o  c o n s i d e r  
s t a k e h o l d e r s  i n t e r e s t .  T h e y  m a y  a l s o  b e  w e a l t h y  t h a t  t h e y  n o  l o n g e r  i n t e n d  t o  m a x i m i z e  
p r o f i t  b u t  g e t  m o r e  u t i l i t y  f o r m  m a x i m i z i n g  m a r k e t  s h a r e  o r  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  l e a d e r s h i p  
e t c .  M o r e k  e t  a l ' s  c o m b i n e d  t h e  a r g u m e n t  t h e y  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  p e r f o r m a n c e  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  
i n c e n t i v e  a l i g n m e n t  a r g u m e n t  d o m i n a t e s  t h e  p e r f o r m a n c e  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  e n t r e n c h m e n t  
a r g u m e n t  f o r  l o w  l e v e l s  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  o w n e r s h i p .  F o r  h i g h e r  l e v e l s  ( a b o u t  5 %  
m a n a g e r i a l  o w n e r s h i p )  t h e  p i c t u r e  i s  r e v e r s e d  a n d  f o r  s t i l l  h i g h e r  l e v e l s  ( a b o u t  3 0 % )  t h e  
p i c t u r e  i s  r e v e r s e d  b a c k  o n c e  a g a i n .  
M E T H O D O L O G Y  
T h e  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  s t u d y  i s  t h e  c o m p a n i e s  q u o t e d  o n  t h e  N i g e r i a n  s t o c k  e x c h a n g e  a s  
a t  3 1 s t  D e c e m b e r ,  2 0 0 6 ,  w h i l e  t h e  s a m p l e  s i z e  i s  t w e n t y  c o m p a n i e s  q u o t e d  o n  t h e  
N i g e r i a n  S t o c k  e x c h a n g e .  T h e  r e a s o n  f o r  t h i s  s a m p l e  s i z e  i s  b e c a u s e  t h e r e  i s  o n l y  
t w e n t y - e i g h t  ( 2 8 )  s e c t o r s  i n  t h e  N i g e r i a n  e c o n o m y  a s  a t  3 1 s t  D e c e m b e r ,  2 0 0 6 ;  a n d  t h e  
c o m p a n i e s  m a k i n g  u p  e a c h  o f  t h e  s e c t o r s  a r e  h o m o g e n e o u s  t o  a  l a r g e  e x t e n t ;  a n d  e i g h t  
s e c t o r s  w e r e  n o t  c o n s i d e r e d  i n  t h i s  s t u d y  b e c a u s e  t h e  f i n a n c i a l s  o f  c o m p a n i e s  m a k i n g  
t h e m  u p  a r e  n o t  u p  t o  d a t e .  T h e  c r o s s  s e c t i o n a l  s u r v e y  r e s e a r c h  d e s i g n  w a s  u s e d  i n  t h i s  
s t u d y .  T h e  r e a s o n  f o r  t h e  c h o i c e  o f  t h i s  b l u e  p r i n t  f o r  d a t a  c o l l e c t i o n  i s  b e c a u s e  d a t a  
w e r e  g a t h e r e d  a t  a  p a r t i c u l a r  p o i n t  i n  t i m e .  P u r p o s i v e  s a m p l i n g  t e c h n i q u e  w a s  u s e d  t o  
s e l e c t  t h e  s a m p l e  s i z e .  T h e  r a t i o n a l e  b e h i n d  t h e  c h o i c e  o f  t h i s  s a m p l i n g  m e t h o d  i s  t o  
a l l o w  t h e  r e s e a r c h e r  t o  s e l e c t  c o m p a n i e s  q u o t e d  o n  N i g e r i a  S t o c k  E x c h a n g e  t h a t  w i l l  
s p e c i f i c a l l y  s u i t  t h e  r e s e a r c h  p u r p o s e .  T h e  d a t a  u s e d  i n  t h i s  s t u d y  w e r e  b a s i c a l l y  
c o l l e c t e d  f o r m  t h e  s e c o n d a r y  s o u r c e .  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  t h e  d a t a  w e r e  f r o m  A n n u a l  r e p o r t s  
a n d  a c c o u n t s  o f  c o m p a n i e s  q u o t e d  o n  t h e  N i g e r i a n  S t o c k  E x c h a n g e  - N S E  F a c t b o o k .  
I n  a n a l y z i n g  t h e  d a t a  c o l l e c t e d ,  t h e  s i m p l e  O r d i n a r y  L e a s t  S q u a r e  ( O L S )  w a s  
u s e d  f o r  t h e  e s t i m a t i o n  o f  t h e  d a t a  f o r  t h i s  s t u d y ;  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  C o c h r a n e - O r c u t t  w a s  
l a t e r  u s e d  t o  i m p r o v e  t h e  r e s u l t .  T h e  m a i n  o b j e c t i v e  i s  t o  d i s c o v e r  i f  O u t s i d e  
S h a r e h o l d e r s  ( O S H )  a n d  I n s i d e  ( m a n a g e r i a l )  S h a r e h o l d e r s  ( I S H )  a r e  s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  
r e l a t e d  t o  f i r m  p e r f o r m a n c e .  B o t h  v a r i a b l e s  a p p e a r  a s  e x p l a n a t o r y  v a r i a b l e s  i n  t h e  f i r m  
p e r f o r m a n c e  e q u a t i o n .  I n  t h e  r e g r e s s i o n  a n a l y s i s ,  b o t h  t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  s h a r e s  o w n e d  
b y  o u t s i d e  i n v e s t o r s  a n d  t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  s h a r e s  o w n e d  b y  m a n a g e m e n t  w e r e  u s e d  t o  
f i n d  o u t  t h e i r  e f f e c t  o n  t h e  e a r n i n g s  p e r  s h a r e  o f  t h e  s e l e c t e d  c o m p a n i e s .  
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Model Specification 
The model to be estimated could however be specified as follows: 
P=f(lSH) ' 
P =f(OSH) 
Where; P = Performance measured by EPS 
OS= Ownership Structure 
ISH= Inside ownership 
OSH = Outside ownership 
EPS =Earnings Per Share 
U1 = enor term 
The model in linear form is below: 
EPS = ao+ a1 ISH+ Ut 
EPS = ao+ a1 OSH + Ut 
Where EPS, ISH and OSH are as previously defined; ao is intercept and a1 are to be 
estimated. Apriori, the expected signs of the parameters a 1 is positive. Due to the 
shortcomings of Tobin Q and the accounting ratio used by Panayotis and Sophia (2006), 
as pointed out by Lindberg and Ross (1981), a different measure of performance, 
Eamings Per Share (EPS) was used for the purpose of this study. 
DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
Following from all the explanations made above, the performance coefficients of the 
regression equation are represented in the table below: 
Inside lwnershil~;;_----r-_______ --,.----------.-----------, 
Regressor Coefficient Standard enor 
INPT 146.3451 22.0881 
ISH -3.6879 0.86156 




The above tabular results can be represented in an equation form as shown below:-
P = 146.3451 - 3.6879ISH 
(6.6255) ( -4.2805) 
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T h e  a b o v e  1 : e s u l t  w a s  g e n e r a t e d  b y  c r o s s  s e c t i o n a l  d a t a  a n a l y s i s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  v a l u e s  o f  
p e r f o r m a n c e  r e p r e s e n t e d  b y  E a r n i n g s  p e r  s h a r e  ( E P S ) .  T h e  r e s e a r c h  a t  t h i s  p o i n t  s e e k s  
t o  f i n d  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  t h e  d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  ( E P S ) ;  a n d  i n d e p e n d e n t  
v a r i a b l e s  ( I S H )  w i t h  a  p r i o r i  e x p e c t a t i o n  t h a t  t h e r e  w i l l  b e  a  p o s i t i v e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
b e t w e e n  t h e  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  q u o t e d  c o m p a n i e s  i n  N i g e r i a  a n d  i n s i d e r  s h a r e  o w n e r s h i p .  
I t  w a s  o b s e r v e d  f r o m  t h e  r e s u l t  t h a t  t h e  s i g n  d i d  n o t  c o m e  o u t  a s  e x p e c t e d .  T h i s  t h u s  
m e a n s  t h a t  t h e  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  q u o t e d  c o m p a n i e s  i n  N i g e r i a  i s  n e g a t i v e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  
i n s i d e r  o w n e r s h i p  o f  o r d i n a r y  s h a r e  c a p i t a l .  G i v e n  t h e  a b o v e  s c e n a r i o ,  i t  c a n  b e  d e d u c e d  
t h a t  a  1 %  c h a n g e  i n  t h e  i n s i d e r  o w n e r s h i p  o f  o r d i n a r y  s h a r e  c a p i t a l  w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  3 6 8 %  
n e g a t i v e  c h a n g e  i n  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  q u o t e d  c o m p a n i e s  i n  N i g e r i a .  I t  i s  a l s o  n o t e d  t h a t  t h e  
R
2
,  i s  f a i r l y  a l r i g h t  a t  5 8 % ,  w h i l e  t h e  r e m a i n i n g  4 2 %  i s  c a p t u r e d  b y  t h e  e n o r  t e r m .  
F r o m  t h e  r e s u l t  i t  w a s  a l s o  s e e n  t h a t  t h e  t - r a t i o  o f  I S H  i s  ( - 4 . 2 8 0 5 ) .  T h i s  v a r i a b l e  i s  
t h e r e f o r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  5 %  l e v e l ,  m e a n i n g  t h a t  t h e  v a r i a b l e ,  i n s i d e r  s h a r e  o w n e r s h i p  
( I S H )  i s  a  n e g a t i v e  b u t  s i g n i f i c a n t  e x p l a n a t o r y  v a r i a b l e  i n  t h e  m o d e l .  
U s i n g  t h e  F  - t e s t  ,  t h e  t a b u l a t e d  F  i s  3 . 3 3  w h i l e  t h e  c o m p u t e d  v a l u e  o f  F  i s  
2 . 8 0 8 9 ;  t h i s  m e a n s  s i n c e  t h e  c o m p u t e d  v a l u e  o f F  i s  l e s s  t h a n  t h e  t a b l e  v a l u e ,  i t  i s  n o t  
s i g n i f i c a n t  a n d ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i n s i d e r  s h a r e  o w n e r s h i p  i s  n o t  o v e r a l l  ,  a  g o o d  a n d  r e l i a b l e  
i n d i c a t o r  o f  p e r f o r m a n c e  ( E S P )  o f  q u o t e d  c o m p a n i e s  o n  t h e  N S E .  T h e  D W  s t a t i s t i c  
w h i c h  i s  2 . 5 3 4 8  i s  o n  t h e  h i g h  s i d e ,  t h o u g h  f e l l  w i t h i n  t h e  g r a y  r e g i o n  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  l a s t  
y e a r  d a t a  c a n  b e  s a i d  n o t  t o  a f f e c t  t h e  c u n e n t  y e a r  d a t a  i n  t h i s  a n a l y s i s ,  t h a t  i s ,  a b s e n c e  
o f  f i r s t  o r d e r  p o s i t i v e  c o n e l a t i o n ,  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  t h e  r e g r e s s i o n  e s t i m a t e s  a r e  u n b i a s e d .  I t  
c a n  t h e r e f o r e  b e  c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  g o i n g  b y  t h e  t - t e s t ,  t h e r e  i s  a  n e g a t i v e  b u t  s i g n i f i c a n t  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  p e r f o r m a n c e s  o f  q u o t e d  c o m p a n i e s  o n  t h e  N S E  a n d  I S H ,  e v e n  
t h o u g h  ,  t h e  o v e r a l l  t e s t  ( F - s t a t i s t i c )  p r o v e s  o t h e r w i s e .  
F o l l o w i n g  t h e  s e c o n d  r e g r e s s i o n  r e s u l t ,  t h e  t a b l e  b e l o w  i s  p r e s e n t e d .  
O u t s i d e  O w n e r s h ·  
'  
R e g r e s s o r  
C o e f f i c i e n t  S t a n d a r d  e n o r  
t - r a t i o  
I N P T  - 2 2 2 . 4 4 4 9  6 8 . 2 8 6 4  - 3 . 2 5 7 5  
O S H  3 . 6 8 7 9  0 . 8 6 1 6  4 . 2 8 0 5  
R "  =  0 .  5 8 4 1 ,  F  =  2 . 8 0 8 9 ,  D W  =  2 . 5 3 4 8 ,  S E R  =  1 3 1 . 9 5 6 7  
T h e  a b o v e  t a b u l a r  r e s u l t  c a n  b e  r e p r e s e n t e d  a s  u s u a l  i n  a n  e q u a t i o n  a s  s h o w n  b e l o w .  
P  =  - 2 2 2 . 4 4 4  9  +  3 . 6 8 7 9 0 S H  
( - 3 . 2 5 7 5 )  ( 4 . 2 8 0 5 )  
T h e  a b o v e  r e s u l t  s h o w s  t h a t ,  t h e  a  p r i o r i  e x p e c t a t i o n  t h a t ,  t h e r e  i s  a  p o s i t i v e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
b e t w e e n  t h e  p e r f o r m a n c e  ( E P S )  o f  c o m p a n i e s  q u o t e d  o n  t h e  N S E  a n d  o u t s i d e  s h a r e  
o w n e r s h i p  i s  v e r y  m u c h  i n  p l a c e ;  g i v e n  t h a t  t h e  s i g n  c a m e  o u t  a s  e x p e c t e d .  
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From the equation above, we deduce from the result of the study that a 1% 
change in the outsider ownership of ordinary share capital will result in 368% positive 
change in performance of quoted companies in Nigeriru.A'iso, the R2 of 58% is equally 
alright, given that only 48% is explained by the en·or tamn.This shows that the v~riable 
OSH and performance (EPS) are properly fitted in thaert1IDdel. The t -ratio of OSH is 
4.2805. This shows that OSH is significant at 5% leveJ I<mcl, therefore, OSH is a reliable 
indicator. Given the F-test, the tabulated F is equal to 3.33 and since our computed F of 
2.8089 is less than 3.33, it is insignificant and the independent variable ( OSH) is not, 
overall a good and reliable indicator of the dependent variable (EPS). From the result, 
the DW which is 2.5348 just as in the case of ISH means there is no evidence of first 
order positive correlation and therefore, the regression estimates are unbiased. 
CONCLUSION 
In this study, we discovered that there is no positive, but rather, a negative and 
significant relationship between inside equity ownership and firm's performance. This 
is not in line with the study carried out by Chung and Pruitt (1996) who opined that 
executive ownership positively influenced firm's performance. Also Palia and 
Lichterberg (1999) concluded that a positive relationship exist between managerial 
ownership and total factor of production. Moreover, Cho (1998) revealed that 
performance is a positive predictor of insider ownership. Himmel berg, Hubbard and 
Palia (1999) also found out that managerial ownership has a positive relationship with 
firm's size which is also an indicator of performance. The findings of this study is also 
at variance with the work of Morek et al (1988) who found limited evidence of a non-
linear relationship between managerial share (herein referred to as inside equity) 
ownership and firm performance. Thus, the position of this study does not give credence 
to the Berle-Means thesis of 1932 which is of the view that ownership affects firm's 
performance. 
However, Demsetz (1983) argues that there is no reason to expect a systematic 
relationship between profitability and insider ownership. In a more recent study, 
Villalonga and Amit (2004) concluded that family ownership (and thus managerial 
ownership where they are the managers as in Oceanic Bank pic in Nigeria) creates value 
only when it is combined with certain forms of control and management. Also, in a 
study of Tiwan ' s electronic industry, Chung & Pruitt (1986) found that inside 
ownership has no influence on total factor productivity; these two studies are in 
agreement wi th the result of this study. The above argument notwithstanding, the 
regression result carried out under this study was stable at 5% significance level and 
calls for further research. However, the result of our second test find support for a 
positive and significant relationship between outside ownership and firm performance. 
Having achieved the aim of this study, it is hereby recommended that firms 
should emphasize more on outside equity ownership; by giving them a substantial 
Ogbulu & Emeni Ownership Structure and the Performance 69 
--
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  j o u r n a l  o f  B u s m e s s  a n d  B e h a v i o r a l  S c i e n c e s '  R e s e a r c h  1  ( 1 )  F a ! £  2 0 1 0  
p o r t i o n  o f  t h e i r  s h a r e  o f l e r i n g .  H o w e \  c r .  o u t s t d e  e q u i t y  s h o u l d  h o w e \  e r  b e  m o n i t o r e d  i n  
o r d e r  t o  p r e v e n t  d i s e c o n o m i e s  w h t c h  m a ; b e  o c c a s i o n e d  b ;  d i f f u s e d  O \ \  n e r s h i p .  F i n a l ! ) .  
m a n a g e r s  s h o u l d  s e e k  o w n e r s '  a p p r O \ a l  b e 1 0 r e  t a k i n g  v i t a l  b u s i n e s s  d e c i s t o n s  ( a s  
s t i p u l a t e d  i n  C A M A .  2 0 0 - l - )  b u t  s h o u l d  a l s o  p r o v i d e  t e c h n i c a l  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  n o n  
m a n a g i n g  o w n e r s  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  t h e i r  understandin~; a n d  s u b s e q u e n t  a p p r o v a l  o f  s u c h  
d e c i s i o n s  t o  e n s u r e  f i r m s '  o p t i m u m  p e r f o r m a n c e .  
R E F E R E N C E S  
S e r l e .  A . A .  a n d  M e a n s .  G . C .  (  1 9 3 2 ) .  T h e  M o d e m  C m p o r a t z o n  a n d  P r i \ ' C i t e  P r o p e r t y  
H a r c o u r t ,  b r a c e  a n d  W o r l d : N e w  Y o r k .  
C h o ,  M . H .  ( 1 9 9 8 )  " O w n e r s h i p  S t r u c t u r e ,  I n v e s t m e n t  a n d  t h e  C o r p o r a t e  V a l u e :  A n  
E m p i r i c a l  A n a l y s i s ' ' ,  J o u r n a l  o f F i n a n c i a l  E c o n o n n c s ,  V o l .  4 7 .  1 0 3 - 2 1 .  
C h u n g ,  K .  H .  a n d  P r u i t t ,  S . W .  ( 1 9 9 6 )  " E x e c u t i v e  O w n e r s h i p .  C o r p o r a t e  V a l u e  a n d  
F r a m e w o r k " ,  J o u r n a l  ofBanAKrn~· a n d  F i n a n c e ,  v o l .  2 0 ,  1 1 3 5 - 1 1 5 9 .  
C o m p a n i e s  a n d  A l l i e d  M a t t e r s  A c t  ( C A M A ) ,  1 9 9 0  
D e m s e t z ,  H .  (  1 9 8 3 ) .  " T h e  S t r u c t u r e  o f  O w n e r s h m  a n d  t h e  T h e o r y  o f  t h e  F i r m ' ' ,  J o u r n a l  
o f  L a w  a n d  E c o n o m i c s ,  V o l .  2 6 .  3 7 5 - 3 9 0 .  
D e m s e t z ,  H .  a n d  L e h n ,  K .  ( 1 9 8 5 ) .  " T h e  S t r u c t u r e  o f  C o r p o r a t e  O w n e r s h i p :  C a u s e s  a n d  
C o n s e q u e n c e s " .  J o u r n a l  E~f molllrcall~cononzrI V o l .  9 3 ,  1 1 5 5 - 1 1 7 7 .  
D e m s e t z ,  H .  a n d  V i l l a l o n g a ,  B .  l 2 0 0 1 ) .  " O ' W n e r s h i r  S t r u c t u r e  A n d  C 0 1 v o r a t e  
P e r f o r m a n c e " ,  S t r u c t u r e  A n d  C 0 1 v o r a t e  P e r f o r m a n c e " .  J o u r n a l  O f  C o r p o r a t e  
F i n c u z c e ,  V o l .  7 ,  2 0 9 - 2 3 3 .  
D i c k e r s o n ,  A . P . ,  G i b s o n  H . D . ,  a n d  T s a k a l o t o s ,  E .  ( 2 0 0 2 )  ' ' T a k e o v e r  R i s k  a n d  t h e  
M a r k e t  F o r  C o r p o r a t e  C o n t r o l :  T h e  E x p e r i e n c e  O f  B r i t i s h  F i r m s  I n  T h e  1 9 7 0 ' s  
a n d  1 9 8 0 ' s " .  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  J o u r n a l  O f  I n d u s t r i a l  O r g a n i ; : , ( l [ i o n ,  V o l .  2 0 ,  1 1 6 7 -
1 1 9 5 .  
.  
H e r m a l i n ,  B .  a n d  W e i s b a c h ,  M .  (  1 9 8 8 )  " T h e  D e t e r m i n a n t s  o f  B o a r d  C o m p o s i t i o n " ,  
R a n d  J o u m a l  O f  E c o n o m i c s ,  V o l .  1 9 ,  5 8 9 - 6 0 6 .  
H i m m e l b e r g ,  C . ,  H u b b a r d ,  G . ,  a n d  P a l t a .  W .  ( 1 9 9 9 )  " U n d e r s t a n d i n g  t h e  D e t e r m i n a n t s  
O f  M a n a g e r i a l  O w n e r s h i p  A n d  T h e  L i n k  B e t w e e n  
O w n e r s h i p  A n d  P e r f o r m a n c e " ,  J o u r n a l  O f  F i n a n c i a l  E c o n o m i c s .  V o l .  5 3 ,  3 5 3 - 3 8 4 .  
J e s e n ,  M . C .  a n d  M e c k l i n g ,  H .  (  1 9 7 6 ) .  ' T h e o r y  o f  t h e  F i r m :  M a n a g e r i a l  B e h a v i o u r ,  
A g e n c y  C o s t s ,  a n d  O w n e r s h i p  S t r u c t u r e " ,  J o u r n a l  0 {  F i n a n c i a l  E c o n o m i c s ,  V o l .  
3 ,  N o .  4 ,  3 0 5 - 3 6 0 .  
L i n b e r g ,  E  a n d  R o s s ,  S .  ( 1 9 8 1 ) .  " T o b i n ' s  Q  R a t i o  a n d  I n d u s t r i a l  O r g a n i z a t i o n "  J o u r n a l  
o f  B u s i n e s s ,  V o l .  5 1 ,  1 - 3 2 .  
L o d e r e r , .  C  a n d  M a r t i n ,  K .  ( 1 9 9 7 )  " E x e c u t i v e  S t o c k  O w n e r s h i p  a n d  P e r f o r m a n c e :  
T r a n c k m g  F a m l 1  r a c e s " ,  J o u r n a l  O f  F i n a n c i a l  E c o n o m i c s ,  V o l .  4 5 ,  2 2 3 - 2 5 5 .  
O g / J U l t L  &  E n w n i  O w n e r s / u p  S t r u c t u r e  a n d  L l w  P e r j o m t w l c e  
7 0  
International journal of Business and Behavioral Sciences' Research 1 (1) Fall, 2010 
McConnel, J. and Servaes. H. (1990), "Additiol1al Evidence on Equity Ownership and 
Corporate Values", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 27,595-612. 
Morek, R .. Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1988) "Management Ownership and Market 
Valuation. An Empirical Analysis" Journal of Financial Eco11omics, Vol. 20, 293-
315. 
Palia, D. and Lichtenberg, F. (1999) "Managerial Ownership and Firm Performance: A 
Re-Examination Using Productivity Measurement", Joumal Of Corporate 
Finance, Vol. 5, 323-339. 
Panayotis, K and Sophia, L. (2006) "Corporate Ownership Structure and Firm 
Performance: Evidence from Greek Firms "Bank of Greece Working Papers. 
Shepherd, W.G. (1990), The Economics Of Industrial Organization, Prentice Hall 
International Editions . 
Short, H. and Keasey, K (1999) "Managerial Ownership And The Perfor ance Of 
Firms: Evidence From the Uk, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. , 9-101. 
Villalonga, B. and Amit, R. (2004), "How Does Family Owners · , Control and 
Management Affect Firm Value?" Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 9, 64-
98. 
Welch E. (2003), "The Relationship between Ownership Structure and Performance in 
Listed Australian Companies", Australian Journal of Management, Vol. 28, 287-
305. 
Ogbulu & Emeni Ownership Structure and the Performance 71 
-
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  j o u r n a l  o f  B u s i n e s s  a n d  B e h a v i o r a l  S c i e n c e s '  R e s e a r c h  1  [ 1 )  F a / £  2 0 1 0  
A P P E N D I X  I  
O w n e r s h i p  s t r u c t u r e  a n d  e a r n i n g s  p e r  s h a r e  
S I N  
N a m e  o f  c o m p a n y  O w n e r s h i p  O w n e r s h i p  T o t a l  
E P S  ( k )  
s t r u c t u r e  I n s i d e  
s t r u c t u r e  o u t s i d e  
I  I n c a r  p i c  1 1 7 , 2 9 2 , 3 6 7  2 1 7 , 7 0 7 , 6 3 3  3 2 5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
3 0  
2  E k o c o r p  p i c  I 4 I  , 4 2 5 , 6 3 0  1 9 1 , 6 6 1 . 1 6 2  3 3 3 , 0 8 6 , 7 9 2  2 0  
3  N e i m e t h  p i c  I 7 5 . 3 7 4 , I 8 9  
4 7 9 , 1 6 7 . 5 6 3  
6 5 4 , 5 4 I , 7 5 2  
3 0  
4  
M a y  &  B a k e r  2 5 6 , 6 3 1 , 9 7 9  
4 4 3 , 3 6 8 . 0 2 I  
7 0 0 , 0 0 , 0 0 0  
3 0  
5  
V i t a f o a m  p i c  
1 6 0 . 1 3 8 , 8 4 8  6 5 8 , 8 6 I , 1 5 2  8 1 9 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  3 4  
6  D i a m o n d  b a n k  
9 8 2 , 4 5 1 , 0 7 5  6 , 6 2 1 . 1 5 7 , 0 7 6  
7 , 6 0 3 , 6 0 8 , 1 5 1  
3 2  
7  G T B  6 9 3 , 1 3 6 , 7 6 8  5 , 3 0 6 , 8 6 3 , 2 3 2  6 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  1 4 2  
8  
O k o m u  o i l  1 6 , 9 9 9 , 4 3 5  3 0 0 , 9 7 0 , 5 6 5  3 1 7 , 9 7 0 , 0 0 0  
I 2 4  
9  
C h e l l a r a m s  p i c  1 5 5 , 0 3 9 , 2 8 2  2 0 , 6 2 3 , 2 1 8  
3 6 I , 4 6 2 . 5 0 0  2 5  
1 0  L a s a c o  p i c  3 2 4 , 3 5 7 , 2 8 8  8 8 5 , 4 6 2 , 7 1 2  
I  , 2 0 9 , 8 2 0 , 0 0 0  1 3  
1 1  
B e t a  g l a s s  p i c  1 0 , 9 2 2 . 8 1 9  4 4 3 , 5 9 7 , 1 8 1  
4 5 4 , 5 2 0 , 0 0 0  
8 4  
1 2  N o r t h .  N i g .  F l o u r  m j l l  2 1 , 7 6 0 , 6 3 5  1 2 6 , 7 3 9 , 3 6 5  I 4 8 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  3 7  
1 3  
F i r s t  A l u m i n i u m  1 4 , 9 5 1 , 1 9 9  1 , 2 2 7 , 2 6 9 , 9 2 3  
I , 2 4 2 , 2 2 1 , 1 2 2  
4  
1 4  
G l a x o s m i t h  k l i n e  1 4 , 2 4 6 , 8 8 6  9 4 2 , 4 5 4 , 3 0 4  
9 5 6 , 7 0 I , 1 9 0  
1 1 3  
I 5  F i r s t  b a n k  
2 4 4 , 7 3 8 , 0 7 0  4 , 9 9 3 , 9 3 1 , 3 1 8  
5 , 2 3 8 , 6 6 9 , 3 8 8  3 3 2  
I 6  
I n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l  b a n k  2 , 3 1 7 , 2 8 8 , 5 1 6  8 , 6 2 2 , 8 4 6 , 9 6 4  
! 0 , 7 6 0 , I 3 5 , 4 8 7  
9 3  
1 7  
S m a r t  p r o d u c t  p i c  2 8 , 5 1 1 , 3 3 7  7 , 4 8 8 , 6 6 3  
3 6 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
6 5 5  
1 8  
C u t i x  p i c  2 3 0 , 2 4 1  , 8 8 5  3 3 , 9 5 6 , 4 I 9  2 6 4 ,  I 9 8 , 3 0 4  2 0 5 6  
1 9  C  &  I  l e a s i n g  
9 2 2 . 5 8 0 , 5 4 0  
6 8 2 , 0 7 7 , 4 5 9  I  , 6 0 4 , 6 5 7 ,  9 9 9  0 8  
2 0  A V D N p l c  
4 1 7 , 8 6 6 , 6 2 0  
I 5 2 , 1 1 0 , 1 5 4  5 6 0 , 0 7 6 , 7 7 4  2 8  
S o u r c e :  A n n u a l  R e p o r t s  a n d  A c c o u n t s ,  2 0 0 6  ( V a r i o u s  i s s u e s )  
A P P E N D I X  I I  
D A T A  U S E D  T O  R U N  T H E  R E G R E S S I O N  
S I N  N a m e  o f  c o m p a n i e s  % I n s i d e  % o u t s i d e  
E P S  ( k )  
1  I n c a r  p i c  
3 5  
6 5  3 0  
2  E k o c o r p  p i c  4 3  
5 7  
2 0  
3  
N e i m e t h  p i c  
2 7  7 3  3 0  
4  M a y  &  B a k e r  
3 7  6 3  
3 0  
5  V i t a f o a m  p i c  2 0  
8 0  
3 4  
6  D i a m o n d  b a n k  1 3  8 7  
3 2  
7  G T B  
1 2  8 8  
1 4 2  
8  O k o m u  o i l  
5  9 5  
1 2 4  
9  C h e l l a r a m s  p i c  4 3  5 7  
2 5  
1 0  l a s a c o  p i c  
'  
2 7  7 3  
1 3  
1 1  B e t a  g l a s s  p i c  
2  9 8  
8 4  
O g b u l u  &  E m e n i  O w n e r s h i p  S t r u c t u r e  a n d  t h e  P e i f o r m a n c e  
7 2  
International journal of Business and Behavioral Sciences' Research 1 (1) Fall, 2010 
12 Northern Nig. Flour mill 15 85 37 
13 First Aluminium 1 99 4 
14 Glaxosmith kline 2 98 113 
15 First bank 5 95 332 
16 Intercontinental bank 20 80 93 • 
17 Smart product pic 79 21 ' 655 
18 Cutix pic 87 13 20.56 
19 C & !leasing 58 42 08 
20 AVON pic 73 27 28 
APPENDIX III 
OBS EPS OSH ISH 
1 0.300000 65.00000 35.00000 
2 0.200000 57.00000 43.00000 
3 0.300000 73.00000 27.00000 
4 0.300000 63.00000 37.00000 
5 0.340000 80.00000 20.00000 
6 0.320000 87.00000 13.00000 
7 1.420000 88.00000 12.00000 
8 1.240000 95.00000 5.000000 
9 0.250000 57.00000 43.00000 
10 0.130000 73.00000 27.00000 
11 0.840000 98.00000 2.000000 
12 0.370000 85.00000 15.00000 
13 0.400000 99.00000 2.000000 
14 1.130000 98.00000 2.000000 
15 3.320000 95.00000 5.000000 
16 0.930000 80.00000 20.00000 
17 6.550000 21.00000 79.00000 
18 20.56000 13.00000 87.00000 
19 0.080000 42.00000 58.00000 
20 0.280000 27.00000 73.00000 
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